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RECENT LEGISLATION
merce fall within this rule. By requiring that all pilots in the state have
Federal licenses, the problem is solved.
Other states have from time to time enacted statutes somewhat similar
to the new Illinois statute, but Illinois is unique in having so whole-heartedly
given the control of aircraft to the Federal government. If a few other
states followed its example we should have two entirely distinct movements
toward unity in air law, one championed by the Uniform State Law, urg-
ing that the states of this country should assert their individual powers
over aeronautics in one voice, and the other initiated by the Illinois statute,
favoring the enactment of only those statutes which subject all flying to
the same rules which govern interstate flight. J. A. G., '31.
BANKS-TRusTEE FOR PROCEEDS OF ITEMS SENT FOR COLLECTION.-It is
provided in a recent Missouri statute that "when a drawee or payor bank
has presented to it for payment an item or items drawn upon or payable
by or at such bank and at the time -has on deposit to the credit of the
maker or drawer an amount equal to such item or items and such drawee
or payor shall fail or close for business as above, after having charged
such item or items to the account of the maker or drawee thereof or other-
wise discharged his liability thereupon, but without such item or items
having been paid or settled for by the drawee or payor either in money or
by an unconditional credit given on its books or on the books of any other
bank which has been requested or accepted so as to constitute such drawee
or payor or other bank debtor therefor, the assets of such drawee or payor
shall be impressed with a trust in favor of the owner or owners of such
item or items for the amount thereof or for the balance payable upon a
number of items which have been exchanged, and such owner or owners
shall be entitled to a preferred claim upon such assets, irrespective of
whether the fund representing such item or items can be traced and identi-
fied as part of such assets or has been intermingled with or converted into
other assets of such failed bank." It continues by providing for such a
preference in the assets of a bank other than the drawee or payor which
shall fail after collecting items sent to it for that purpose, but before actual
payment by it to the owner of such items. Mo. Laws 1929, 208, sec. 11.
Since the decision of First National Bank of Lapeer v. Sanford (1895),
62 Mo. A. 394, the courts of this state have applied substantially the rule
expressed above. "The Missouri doctrine thus appears to be that in the
absence of intention to the contrary, as designated by a reciprocal ac-
counts arrangement to send paper for collection and remittance creates
the relationship of principal and agent which is not changed by an act of
the agent in contravention of his authority by the method of collection,
credit, attempted remittance or by mixing the proceeds with general assets,
provided that funds sufficient to constitute a res exist in the insolvent bank
or solvent correspondent banks at the time of the charge and of insolvency."
Note (1929) 14 ST. LouIs L. REV. 406. This view is opposed to that an-
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nounced by the courts of an overwhelming number of states. Bank v.
Bradley (1926), 136 S. C. 511, 134 S. E. 510; Leach v. Iowa State Saving
Bank (Ia. 1926), 211 N. W. 517.
The statute provides for a preference to the extent of the item or items
or for the balance payable upon a number of items which have been e-
changed. It is not probable, although the language might so indicate, that
the courts in construing this statute will permit a preference where the
owner of the item or items is another bank which is in the habit of col-
lecting for the insolvent institution and giving or accepting credit as the
balance might dictate. The decision in American Bank of De Soto v. Peo-
ple's Bank of De Soto (Mo. 1923), 255 S. W. 943, in which such a reciprocal
accounts arrangement existed, was justified in its refusal of a preference
upon this ground by the cases of Bank of Poplar Bluff v. Millspaugh (1926),
313 Mo. 412, 281 S. W. 733 and Federal Reserve Bank v. Millspaugh (1926),
314 Mo. 1, 282 S. W. 706.
It is noticed that the statute is silent in requiring that assets at least
equal in amount to the item or items for which preference is sought, be
present in the vault of the insolvent bank Or solvent correspondent banks,
at the time of failure of the former. It is perhaps indicated, however, by
this language ". .. irrespective of whether the fund representing such item
or items can be traced and identified as part of such items." It is con-
ceivable that since the courts are no longer burdened with reconciling their
positions with age-old principles, such a requirement by a construction of
this statute will be dispensed with.
With the exception of the proposition mentioned above, and that provided
for in sec. 10, Mo. Laws 1929, 207, which preserves the rights of the owner
of the item where remittance has been made in paper subsequently dis-
honored, the above statute appears a codification of the existing Missouri
doctrine, and has relieved the courts from the burden of justifying by
legal propositions and maxims a view in harmony with business practices.
Note (1929) 14 ST. Louis L. Ray. 406. F. E. M., '30.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-REGULATION OF ICE INDUSTRY IN ARKANSAS.-
An interesting development in recent legislation is to be found in Acts of
Arkansas, 1929, 110, Act No. 55, "An Act for the Regulation of the Sale,
Delivery and Distribution of Ice, and Vesting the Railroad Commission with
Jurisdiction over the Same." The Act provides (sec. 1) "that the use of
ice is a public necessity, the use, manufacture, sale, delivery and distribu-
tion thereof, within the State of Arkansas, has direct relation to the health,
comfort, safety, and convenience to the public, the same being a prime
necessity of life and monopolistic in its nature and price, manufacture, sale
and delivery and distribution of ice within the State of Arkansas is hereby
declared to be a public business impressed with a public trust and subject
to public regulation as hereinafter enacted." Provisions follow vesting the
power to regulate, supervise, establish and enforce prices and rates, re-
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